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Abstract. Protocol for fair exchange of digital signatures is essential in many applications
including contract signing, electronic commerce, or even peer-to-peer file sharing. In such
a protocol, two parties, Alice and Bob, would like to exchange digital signatures on some
messages in a fair way. It is known that a trusted arbitrator is necessary in the realization
of such a protocol.
We identify that in some scenarios, it is required that prior to the completion of the protocol,
no observer should be able to tell whether Alice and Bob are conducting such an exchange.
Consider the following scenario in which Apple engages Intel in an exchange protocol to sign
a contract that terminates their OEM agreement. The information would be of value to a
third party (such as the stock broker, or other OEM companies). If the protocol transcript
can serve as an evidence that such a communication is in progress, any observer of this
communication, including the employees of both companies, would be tempted to capture
the transcript and sell it to outsiders.
We introduce a new notion called perfect ambiguous optimistic fair exchange (PAOFE),
which is particularly suitable to the above scenario. PAOFE fulfils all traditional require-
ments of cryptographic fair exchange of digital signatures and, in addition, guarantees that
the communication transcript cannot be used as a proof to convince others that the protocol
is in progress. Specifically, we formalize the notion of PAOFE and present a rigorous secu-
rity model in the multi-user setting under the chosen-key attack. We also present a generic
construction of PAOFE from existing cryptographic primitives and prove that our proposal
is secure with respect to our definition in the standard model.
1 Introduction
Consider a scenario in which Apple engages Intel in a fair exchange protocol to sign a contract
that pays an amount of money for the early termination of the use of Intel technology in the next
generation of Macbook and iMac desktop computers. In this situation, reveal of the contract, or
leakage of the information about this contract, prior to its effective date will be potentially harmful
to the companies. For instance, Apple may be reluctant to expose prematurely the changes it is
introducing to its next generation products, which may possibly affect the sales of the current
generation of the products. On the other hand, the potential termination of cooperation with
Apple may lead to a decline of Intel’s shares value. Therefore, it is necessary that the fair exchange
protocol should not leak any information about the signatures being exchanged.
To the best of our knowledge, ambiguous optimistic fair exchange (AOFE) [14] is the closest
cryptographic solution to the above problem. An AOFE protocol comprises three parties, namely,
signer Alice, verifier Bob, and a semi-trusted third party known as the “arbitrator”. In a typically
execution of an AOFE protocol, Alice delivers a “commitment” of her signature, called ambiguous
partial signature, to Bob. Upon successful verification of the ambiguous partial signature, Bob
delivers his full signature to Alice. After verifying the full signature from Bob, Alice sends to Bob
her own full signature. This completes the protocol.
Bob can approach the arbitrator for assistance in the situation in which Alice refuses to send
her full signature at the end of the exchange protocol. The ambiguous partial signature is designed
⋆ This work is supported by ARC Future Fellowship FT0991397.
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in such a way that the arbitrator can turn it into Alice’s full signature, which is indistinguishable
to a “real” signature created by Alice. In this way, as long as the arbitrator is trusted to carry out
its duty, Bob can always be assured he can obtain a full signature from Alice, either from Alice or
the arbitrator. In addition, the arbitrator is not required to take part in typical executions of the
protocol.
AOFE differs from traditional optimistic fair exchange (OFE) [1] in the sense that the ambigu-
ous partial signature does not reveal the identity of its creator. Specifically, in OFE, everyone can
verify that Alice has created a commitment of her signature in the first step. This may create an
unfair situation to Alice as Bob can simply use Alice’s commitment as a mean to his advantage.
For instance, if Alice’s signature represents her contract tender for Bob’s service, Bob can use
Alice’s commitment as a way to ask for a higher price from another party. On the other hand,
the ambiguous partial signature in AFOE has the extra property that it can be created by either
Alice or Bob. Thus, while Bob can be assured that this is Alice’s commitment of her signature, he
cannot convince anybody that this is Alice’s commitment since he could have been the creator of
the ambiguous partial signature as well. Nonetheless, in AOFE, the arbitrator knows who is the
creator of the ambiguous signature.
Unfortunately, AOFE is inadequate to the aforementioned problem we raised earlier. If AOFE
is employed in the above scenario, Apple will transmit the ambiguous partial signature to Intel on
the contract of the termination of the use of Intel technology in its next generation of computers as
the first step of the exchange. This ambiguous partial signature itself leaks sufficient information
to be valuable. The reason is that in this scenario, it does not matter who is the signer of this
contract. The valuable information to an outsider is that these two companies are discussing about
a potential termination, which is the partial signature. The ambiguous partial signature created
by Apple or Intel is sufficient evidence to prove the authenticity of the information. At the first
sight, one may think that providing a secure channel between the parties would be sufficient in
the above scenario. Nevertheless, this approach has a huge drawback. To build a secure channel
between any two parties is known to be extremely expensive, and therefore, this approach will not
be feasible in practice.
One key observation about the existing exchange protocol is that the ambiguous partial signa-
ture in AOFE, as well as the regular partial signature in OFE, is indeed publicly verifiable. This is
not strictly a necessary functional requirement of an exchange protocol. In fact, this may have an
undesirable effect as illustrated in our case earlier. In general, if Bob is known to be trustworthy,
for example, if Bob is a government department, then malicious observer Oven who obtains an
ambiguous partial signature submitted to Bob knows the intention of Alice. Besides, we make the
observation that the arbitrator in AOFE knows who the creator of an ambiguous partial signature
is, and is capable of converting it into a full signature. A high level of trust has to be placed on
the arbitrator.
Hence, we introduce a new notion, called Perfect Ambiguous Optimistic Fair Exchange (PAOFE),
as a practical cryptographic solution to the aforementioned scenario. Indeed, our solution builds
on top of AOFE and it also fulfills all the security requirements of an AOFE. In addition, PAOFE
enjoys a new property called Perfect Ambiguity in which the equivalent of an “ambiguous partial
signature” leaks no information about the actual signer, intended recipient and the signature itself,
and not even in the view of the arbitrator. Thus, no outsider can tell if an exchange is in progress.
1.1 Related Work
Optimistic fair exchange (OFE), well-known for solving the fair exchange problem, was first intro-
duced by Asokan, Schunter and Waidner [1]. Since then, extensive research on the issue [5,6,9–13,
16–21] have been conducted. An optimistic fair exchange protocol consists of a signer, a verifier,
and a semi-trusted third party named “arbitrator”. Typically such a protocol can be conducted in
three message flows as follows. Firstly, Alice the signer initiates the protocol by delivering a partial
signature to Bob the verifier. A valid partial signature not only serves as an evidence to Bob that
Alice has committed to endorse a certain message, but also assures Bob that he will receive Alice’s
full signature at the end of the protocol. This is due to the property that the arbitrator has the
3
power to convert a valid partial signature into a full signature. In the second step, Bob delivers
his full signature to Alice. Later, if Alice is honest, she will send her full signature to Bob in the
third step, and the exchange process finishes. Note that in normal circumstance, no participation
from the arbitrator is required and thus, the term ‘optimistic’. On the other hand, the arbitrator
is trusted in two senses. Alice trusts the arbitrator would not convert her partial signature into a
full signature unless Bob submits his full signature. At the same time, Bob trusts the arbitrator
that if he submits his full signature, the arbitrator would convert Alice’s partial signature into a
full one.
Security of early optimistic fair exchange protocols are studied in the single-user setting, i.e.,
there is only one signer, one verifier along with one arbitrator. The first formal security model was
proposed in [1, 2], which considered the cases when the signer or verifier cheats but ignored the
one that an arbitrator itself might be potentially dishonest. It was further extended by Dodis and
Reyzin [9] to a more generalized model in which a possibly cheating arbitrator is discussed. Since
there are many users in the real world, it would be practical to allow a number of signers sharing
the same arbitrator. In 2007, Dodis, Lee and Yum [8] considered optimistic fair exchange in the
multi-user setting, where there are many signers and verifiers along with one arbitrator in a system.
In the multi-user setting, dishonest users are allowed to collude to cheat another user. Dodis et
al. [8] pointed out that the security of an OFE in the single-user setting does not necessarily
guarantee that in the multi-user setting. Furthermore, they proposed a formal definition of OFE
in the multi-user setting and a generic construction that is secure in this more practical model
was also proposed [8].
In an orthogonal dimension, most optimistic fair exchange protocols are studied in the certified-
key model (also known as the registered-key model [3]). In this model, to use a public key, the
adversary must show its knowledge of the corresponding private key, and is only allowed to make
queries with respect to the registered public keys. In 2008, Huang, Yang, Wong and Susilo [15]
studied the security of optimistic fair exchange in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model,
where the adversary can choose its public key arbitrarily probably without knowing the corre-
sponding private keys. The adversary is allowed to make queries with respect to these arbitrarily
chosen public keys. They demonstrated, through an example, that a provably secure fair exchange
in the certified-key model may not be secure in the chosen-key model. Furthermore, a generic
optimistic fair exchange construction secure in this model was proposed.
In 2008, Huang, Yang, Wong and Susilo [14] introduced a new security notion called the
signer ambiguity to OFE, which requires that Bob is able to generate a partial signature that is
indistinguishable to a real partial signature generated by Alice. With this property, Bob will not
be able to convince any outsiders that a partial signature was indeed generated by Alice. They
named OFE with this new security property Ambiguous Optimistic Fair Exchange. Besides, they
proposed a formal security model for AOFE in the multi-user setting and chosen key model, a
generic construction of AOFE and the first efficient AOFE scheme.
1.2 Our Contributions
In this paper we make the following contributions.
1. We propose the notion of Perfect Ambiguous Optimistic Fair Exchange, which allows a signer
Alice to generate a partial signature in such a way that no outsider, not even the arbitrator,
is able to infer any useful information about the signature. Indeed, a partial signature in
PAOFE generated by the signer Alice with Bob being the receiver is indistinguishable to a
random bit string chosen from the signature space. In other words, any partial signature is
indistinguishable to a partial signature on a random message with respect to a random signer
and receiver. To realize this notion, Bob’s secret key is required in the verification of the partial
signature in PAOFE. Thus, only Bob is able to verify the partial signature, and an outsider
gains nothing about the transaction. Both the identities of the signer and receiver and the
content of an transaction are perfectly hidden.
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2. We define a security model for PAOFE in the multi-user setting under chosen-key attack.
Our model captures the existing security requirements for AOFE, namely, signer ambiguity,
resolution ambiguity, security against signers, security against verifiers and security against
the arbitrator. In addition, PAOFE covers an additional requirement: perfect ambiguity. It is
required that any user can generate a partial signature whose distribution is indistinguishable
from that of a partial signatures generated by Alice. In other words, a specific partial signature
generated by Alice with recipient Bob is indistinguishable from a partial signature uniformly
randomly chosen from the whole signature space.
3. We propose a generic construction of PAOFE from two well established cryptographic primi-
tives, namely, AOFE and key-private encryption and provide the security proof of our proposal
in the proposed model. Our generic construction works in the standard model and does not
involve any extra assumptions.
1.3 Paper Organization
In the next section, we review the notions and security models of public key encryption and
AOFE respectively. In Section 3, a formal definition of PAOFE, together with the security model
in the multi-user and chosen key setting is proposed. Then, we propose a generic construction of
PAOFE and also provide the security proof of our scheme under our model in Section 4. Finally,
we conclude the paper in Section 5.
2 Building Blocks
Throughout the paper, the following notations are used. For a finite set S, s← S denotes that a
element is randomly chosen from S. By y ← AO(x), we mean the algorithm A, on input x and
having access to oracle O, outputs y. By x := y, we mean variable x is assigned with the value of
y. We use [A1(in1) → out1]
P⇐⇒ [A2(in2) → out2] to denote that two PPT algorithms A1 and A2
outputs out1 and out2 respectively upon the completion of the protocol P in which A1 takes as
input in1 and A2 takes as input in2.
2.1 Encryption
A public key encryption scheme E consists of three algorithms: E = (Kg,Enc,Dec). We consider in-
distinguishability of encryptions against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks, denoted by IE-CCA [4].
It is identical to the more widely used notion IND-CCA [7]. Here we just adopt the notion IE-CCA,
as the authors did in [4], to distinguish with another kind of indistinguishability to be consid-
ered next. For an efficient algorithm A, which runs in two stages of find and guess, we define the





where A is allowed to invoke the decryption oracle ODec(·) at any point with the only restriction
of not querying cb during the guess stage. The encryption scheme E is said to be IE-CCA secure if
the function IE-AdvEA(k) is negligible for any probabilistic polynomial-time time adversary A.
It is well-known that the above security notion of encryption schemes captures the strongest
message-privacy property. Given a challenge ciphertext, no information about the underlying mes-
sage (plaintext) will be leaked in an IE-CCA secure encryption scheme. However, it does not take
into account the privacy of keys, that is, given a ciphertext, the above notion does not include
the privacy of the public key of the recipient. To hide the information about the public key under
which an encryption is conducted, we consider indistinguishability of keys under adaptive chosen
ciphertext attacks, denoted by IK-CCA [4]. For an efficient algorithm A, which runs in two stages





(ek0, dk0)← Kg(1κ), (ek1, dk1)← Kg(1κ),
(m,α)← ADdk0 (·),Ddk1 (·)(ek0, ek1, find), b← {0, 1},




where A is allowed to invoke the decryption oracles Ddk0(·) and Ddk1(·) at any point with the
only restriction of not querying cb to neither oracle during the guess stage. The scheme E is said
to be IK-CCA secure if the function IK-AdvEA(k) is negligible for any probabilistic polynomial-time
adversary A.
Though the goals of message-privacy and key-privacy are orthogonal, it is very desirable, from
a practical point of view, that an encryption scheme satisfies both sides. To guarantee both the
message-privacy and key-privacy properties at the same time, we combine the above two security
notions into one.
Definition 1. An encryption scheme E consisting of three algorithms E = (Kg, Enc, Dec) is said
to be IE-IK-CCA secure if for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, the advantage of A
AdvIE-IKA (κ) is negligible in κ, where Adv
IE-IK
A (κ) is defined as∣∣∣∣∣∣Pr
b = b̃
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(ek, dk)← Kg(1κ), (m,α)← AODec(ek, find), b← {0, 1},
cb ←
{
Encek(m) if b = 0





where C is the whole ciphertext space with respect to any message and any public key, and A is
allowed invoke the decryption oracle ODec(·) at any point with the only restriction of not querying
cb during the guess stage.
It is easy to see that any public key encryption scheme that is both IE-CCA secure and IK-CCA
secure will be IE-IK-CCA secure. Since Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [7] is both IE-CCA secure
and IK-CCA secure [4], it is IE-IK-CCA secure.
2.2 Ambiguous Optimistic Fair Exchange
We review the notion and security model of the ambiguous optimistic fair exchange protocol
introduced in [14].
Definition 2. An ambiguous optimistic fair exchange scheme involves the users (signers and ver-
ifiers) and the arbitrator, and consists of the following (probabilistic) polynomial-time algorithms:
– PMGen: On input 1κ where κ is a security parameter, it outputs a system parameter PM .
– SetupTTP: On input PM , the algorithm generates a secret key ASK, and a public key APK
of the arbitrator.
– SetupUser: On input PM and (optionally) APK, it outputs a secret/public key pair (SK,PK).
For a user Ui, we use (SKi, PKi) to denote the user’s key pair.
– Sig and Ver: Sig(M,SKi, PKi, PKj , APK), outputs a (full) signature σ on M of user Ui with
the designated verifier Uj, where message M is chosen by user Ui from the message spaceM
defined under PKi, while Ver(M , σ, PKi, PKj, APK) outputs ⊤ or ⊥, indicating σ is Ui’s
valid full signature on M with the designated verifier Uj or not.
– PSig and PVer: These are partial signing and verification algorithms respectively. PSig(M,SKi,
PKi, PKj , APK) outputs a partial signature σP , while PVer(M,σP ,PK, APK) outputs ⊤ or
⊥, where PK = {PKi, PKj}.
– Res: This is the resolution algorithm. Res(M,σP , ASK,PK), where PK = {PKi, PKj}, out-
puts a full signature σ, or ⊥ indicating the failure of resolving a partial signature.
Resolution ambiguity property states that
– any “resolved signature” Res(M , PSig(M , SKi, PKi, PKj, APK), ASK, {PKi, PKj}) is
computationally indistinguishable from the “actual signature” Sig(M , SKi, PKi, PKj, APK).
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The security of an ambiguous optimistic fair exchange scheme consists of four aspects: signer
ambiguity, security against signers, security against verifiers, and security against the arbitrator.
The security models of them in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model are reviewed below.
SIGNER AMBIGUITY. We require that any probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher D suc-
ceeds with at most negligible probability greater than 1/2 in the following experiment.
PM ← PMGen(1k)
(ASK,APK) ← SetupTTP(PM)
(M, (SK0, PK0), (SK1, PK1), δ) ← DORes(APK)
b ← {0, 1}
σP ← PSig(M,SKb, PKb, PK1−b, APK)
b′ ← DORes(σP , δ)
success of A := [b′ = b ∧ (M,σP , {PK0, PK1}) ̸∈ Query(D,ORes)]
where δ is D’s state information, oracle ORes takes as input a valid partial signature σP of user Ui
on message M with respect to verifier Uj (i.e. (M , σP , PKi, PKj) such that PVer(M , σP , {PKi,
PKj}, APK) = ⊤), and outputs a full signature σ on M under PKi, PKj , and Query(D,ORes) is
the set of valid queries D issued to the resolution oracle. That is to say, given a partial signature
σP from a signer A, a verifier B should not be able to convince others that A was indeed the signer
of σP , as B can generate partial signatures that look indistinguishable from those generated by A.
SECURITY AGAINST SIGNERS. We require that any PPT adversary A succeeds with at most
negligible probability in the following experiment.
PM ← PMGen(1k)
(ASK,APK) ← SetupTTP(PM)
(SKB , PKB) ← SetupUser(PM,APK)
(M,σP , PKA) ← AO
B
PSig,ORes(APK,PKB)
σ ← Res(M,σP , ASK, {PKA, PKB})
success of A := [PVer(M,σP , {PKA, PKB}, APK) = ⊤
∧ Ver(M,σ, PKA, PKB , APK) = ⊥
∧ (M,PKA) ̸∈ Query(A, OBPSig)]
where oracle ORes is described in the previous experiment, oracle O
B
PSig takes as input (M,PKi) and
outputs a signature onM with respect to PKi and PKB generated using SKB , andQuery(A, OBPSig)
is the set of queries made by A to oracle OBPSig. In other words, no signer should be able to produce
a partial signature that looks good to a verifier but cannot be resolved to a full signature by the
honest arbitrator.
SECURITY AGAINST VERIFIERS. We require that any PPT adversary A succeeds with at
most negligible probability in the following experiment.
PM ← PMGen(1k)
(ASK,APK) ← SetupTTP(PM)
(SKA, PKA) ← SetupUser(PM,APK)
(M,σ, PKB) ← AOPSig,ORes(APK,PKA)
success of A := [Ver(M,σ, PKA, PKB , APK) = ⊤
∧ (M, ·, {PKA, PKB}) ̸∈ Query(A, ORes)]
where oracle ORes is described in the experiment of signer ambiguity, Query(A, ORes) is the set
of queries made by A to oracle ORes, and oracle OPSig takes as input (M,PKj) and outputs a
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signature on M with respect to PKA and PKj generated using SKA. In other words, no verifier
should be able to complete any partial signature σP into a full signature, without explicitly asking
the arbitrator to do so.
SECURITY AGAINST THE ARBITRATOR. We require that any PPT adversary A succeeds
with at most negligible probability in the following experiment.
PM ← PMGen(1k)
(APK,ASK∗) ← A(PM)
(SKA, PKA) ← SetupUser(PM,APK)
(M,σ, PKB) ← AOPSig(ASK∗, APK,PKA)
success of A := [Ver(M,σ, PKA, PKB , APK) = ⊤
∧ (M,PKB) ̸∈ Query(A, OPSig)]
where ASK∗ is A’s state information, which might not be the corresponding private key of APK,
oracle OPSig is described in the previous experiment, and Query(A, OPSig) is the set of queries
made by A to oracle OPSig. In other words, the arbitrator should not be able to produce a full
signature without explicitly asking the signer to generate a partial one.
3 Perfect Ambiguous Optimistic Fair Exchange
In a PAOFE scheme, we require that given a partial signature, no outsider should be able to learn
any information about it. Specifically, the message on which the partial signature was generated,
in addition to the identities of both the signer and the receiver should be completely hidden. To
achieve this, we require that the verification algorithm in PAOFE to involve the secret key of the
receiver, rather than the case that the partial signature is publicly verifiable in AOFE. Besides, we
extend the resolution algorithm in AOFE to the resolution protocol in PAOFE. Since an algorithm
can be seen as a non-interactive protocol, our model is more general and could capture a larger
class of schemes.
Definition 3. A perfect ambiguous optimistic fair exchange scheme involves the users (signers
and verifiers) and the arbitrator, and consists of the following (probabilistic) polynomial-time al-
gorithms/protocols:
– PMGen: On input 1κ where κ is a security parameter, this algorithm outputs a system pa-
rameter PM.
– SetupTTP: On input PM, the algorithm generates a secret key ASK, and a public key APK of
the arbitrator.
– SetupUser: On input PM and (optionally) APK, it outputs a secret/public key pair (SK,PK).
For a user Ui, we use (SKi,PKi) to denote the user’s key pair.
– Sig and Ver: Sig(M , SKi, PKi, PKj, APK), outputs a (full) signature σ on message M of
user Ui with the designated verifier Uj, while Ver(M , σ, PKi, PKj, APK) outputs ⊤ or ⊥,
indicating σ is Ui’s valid full signature on M with the designated verifier Uj or not.
– PSig and PVer: These are partial signing and verification algorithms respectively. PSig(M,SKi,
PKi,PKj ,APK), run by a signer Ui, outputs a partial signature σP , while PVer(M,σP , SKj ,PKi,
PKj ,APK), run by a verifier Uj, outputs ⊤ or ⊥.
– Res: This is a resolution protocol between the verifier Uj and the arbitrator, involving a pair
of interactive algorithms (ResV ,ResT ). ResV (M , σP , SKj, PKi, PKj, APK), run by the verifier,
outputs a full signature σ, or ⊥ indicating the failure of resolving a partial signature.
Resolution ambiguity property states that
– any “resolved signature” ResV (M , PSig(M , SKi, PKi, PKj, APK), SKj, PKi, PKj, APK) is
computationally indistinguishable from the “actual signature” Sig(M , SKi, PKi, PKj, APK).
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3.1 PAOFE models
– Perfect ambiguity: Intuitively, we require that no outsiders, even the arbitrator, should be
able to learn any information about a partial signature such as the content of the message
or the identities of the signer and receiver. This ensures the privacy for both the signer and
the receiver. To achieve this property, we require that in the view of an outsider, the par-
tial signature is indistinguishable to a signature randomly sampled from the signature space.













b ← {0, 1}
σP ←
{
PSig(M, SKA,PKA,PKB ,APK) if b = 0







PVer(σP , Υ )
success of A := [b′ = b
∧(M,σP ,PKA) ̸∈ Query(A, OBPVer)]
where Υ is A’s state information, S is the whole partial signature space, oracle OBPSig takes as
input (M,PKj) and outputs a partial signature of PKB’s on M with the receiver’s public key
being PKj , oracle O
B
FakePSig takes as input (M,PKi) and returns a fake partial signature of
user Ui’s generated using SKB on M with the receiver’s public key being PKB, oracle O
B
PVer
takes as input a partial signature σP of user PKi’s on message M with the verifier being PKB,
i.e., (M,σP ,PKi), and outputs ⊤ or ⊥, and Query(A, OBPVer) is the set of queries A issued to
oracle OBPVer. In all these oracle queries, A can arbitrarily choose a public key PKi, probably
without knowing the corresponding private key. However, as in AOFE, we do require that
there exists a polynomial time algorithm to check the validity of the key pair output by A,
i.e., if SKA matches PKA, or if (SKA,PKA) is a possible output of Setup
User. Note that in
previous ambiguous optimistic fair exchange models, the partial verification oracle OBPVer was
not provided, as a partial signature is publicly verifiable. To cope with the change in PAOFE
that partial signature is no longer publicly verifiable, we provide a partial signature verification
oracle to the adversary in the security model.
– Signer Ambiguity: Informally, signer ambiguity means that given a partial signature σP
from a signer A, a verifier B should not be able to convince others that σP was indeed generated
by A, as B may forge partial signatures that look indistinguishable from those generated by A.




(M, (SK0,PK0), (SK1,PK1), Υ ) ← AORes(APK)
b ← {0, 1}
σP ←
{
PSig(M, SK0,PK0,PK1,APK), b = 0
FakePSig(M,SK1,PK0,PK1,APK), b = 1
b′ ← AORes(σP , Υ )
success of A := [b′ = b
∧ (M,PK0,PK1) ̸∈ Query(A, ORes)
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where Υ isA’s state information, oracle ORes takes an input (M,PKi,PKj) and starts an execu-
tion of the Res protocol with the adversary running the interactive algorithm ResR , algorithm
FakePSig is a fake partial signature signing algorithm and FakeSig(M,SKj ,PKi,PKj ,APK)
outputs a forged partial signature σP on M of user Ui with the designated verifier Uj generated
using SKj , and Query(A, ORes) is the set of queries A issued to the resolution oracle ORes.
In this oracle query, A can arbitrarily choose two public key PKi and PKj probably without
knowing the corresponding private key. However, as in the previous experiment, we do require
that there exists a PPT algorithm to check the validity of the two key pairs output by A, i.e.,
if SKb matches PKb for b = 0, 1, or if (SKb,PKb) is a possible output of Setup
User.
– Security Against Signers: We require that any PPT adversary A, who models a dishonest




(SKB ,PKB) ← SetupUser(PM,APK)








InputV := (M,σP , SKB ,PKA,PKB ,APK)
[ResT (InputT )→ stateT ]
Res⇐⇒ [ResV(InputV)→ σ]
success of A := [PVer(M,σP , SKB ,PKA,PKB ,APK) = ⊤
∧ Ver(M,σ,PKA,PKB ,APK) = ⊥
∧ (M,PKA) ̸∈ Query(A, OBFakePSig)]
where all the four oracles are described in the previous experiments, Query(A, OBFakePSig)
is the set of queries made by A to oracle OBFakePSig. Note that the adversary is not allowed
to corrupt PKB , otherwise it can easily success in the experiment by simply using SKB to
produce a fake partial signature under public keys PKA, PKB and outputting it.
– Security Against Verifiers: We require that any PPT adversary A, who models a dishonest






success of A := [Ver(M,σ,PKA,PKB ,APK) = ⊤
∧ (M,PKA,PKB) ̸∈ Query(A, ORes)]
where oracle ORes is described in the previous experiments, oracle OPSig takes as input
(M,PKj) and outputs a partial signature of PKA’s on M with the receiver’s public key being
PKj generated using SKA, oracle OFakePSig takes as input (M,PKi) and returns a fake partial
signature of user Ui’s generated using SKA on M with the receiver’s public key being PKA,
oracle OPVer takes as input a partial signature σP of user Ui’s on message M with the re-
ceiver’s public key being PKA, i.e., (M,σP ,PKi), and outputs ⊤ or ⊥, and Query(A, ORes) is
the set of queries A issued to the resolution oracle. In the queries to the three oracles OPSig,
OFakePSig and OPVer, A can arbitrarily choose a public key PKi, probably without knowing
the corresponding private key.
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– Security Against the Arbitrator: We require that any PPT adversary A, who models a






success of A := [Ver(M,σ,PKA,PKB ,APK) = ⊤
∧ (M,PKB) ̸∈ Query(A, OPSig)]
where all the three oracles are described in the previous experiment, ASK∗ is A’s state infor-
mation, which might not be the corresponding secret key of APK, and Query(A, OPSig) is the
set of queries A issued to oracle OPSig.
4 Generic Construction
In this section, we will present a generic construction of PAOFE. Let Γ = (PMGen, SetupTTP,
SetupUser, Sig, Ver, PSig, PVer, Res) be an ambiguous optimistic fair exchange scheme. Let E = (Kg,
Enc, Dec) be a public key encryption scheme that is IE-IK-CCA secure.
A perfect ambiguous optimistic fair exchange can be constructed as follows:
– PMGen: This algorithm calls Γ.PMGen(1κ) → PM where κ is a security parameter, and
outputs PM := PM .
– SetupTTP: The arbitrator runs Γ.SetupTTP(PM) → (ASK,APK), and sets (ASK,APK) :=
(ASK,APK).
– SetupUser: Each user Ui runs Γ.Setup
User(PM, APK)→ (SKi, PKi) and E .Kg(1κ)→ (eki, dki)
respectively, and sets (SKi, PKi) := ((SKi, dki), (PKi, eki)).
– PSig: To partially sign a message M with the verifier Uj , Ui runs Γ.PSig(M || PKi|| PKj , SKi,
PKi, PKj , APK)→ σ′P and then encrypts it under Uj ’s public encryption key ekj by running
c = E .Encekj (σ′P ). The partial signature is set as σP := c.
– PVer: On receiving a partial signature σP on message M from the signer Ui, user Uj de-
crypts it using its own decryption key dkj , i.e., σ
′
P = E .Decdkj (σP ), and then checks if
Γ.PVer(M ||PKi||PKj , σ′P , PKi, PKj , APK) = ⊤. If so, it accepts; otherwise, it rejects.
– Sig: To fully sign a message M for the verifier Uj , Ui calls Γ.Sig(M || PKi|| PKj , SKi, PKi,
PKj , APK)→ σ and sends σ to Uj .
– Ver: On receiving a full signature σ from Ui, Uj outputs Γ.Ver(M || PKi|| PKj , σ, PKi, PKj ,
APK).
– Res: Given a partial signature σP on message M from the signer Ui, user Uj decrypts it using
its own decryption key dkj , i.e., σ
′
P = E .Decdkj (σP ), and sends (M,σ′P ,PKi,PKj) to the
arbitrator.The arbitrator first checks the validity of σ′P by running Γ.PVer(M || PKi|| PKj , σ′P ,
PKi, PKj , APK). If it’s invalid, it returns ⊥ to Uj . Otherwise, it returns Γ.Res(M || PKi||
PKj , σ
′
P , ASK, PKi, PKj) to Uj .
4.1 Security Analysis
Our generic construction is secure according to the model in Section 3.1. Detail security analysis
is presented in Appendix A.
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5 Conclusion
We proposed the notion of perfect ambiguous optimistic fair exchange, and gave a formal security
model. We then proposed a generic construction of PAOFE, and proved its security under the
proposed model in the standard model.
Our generic construction involves an encryption and an AOFE scheme and thus, it is bounded
to be less efficient than AOFE. We leave it as our future work to construct more efficient PAOFE
schemes, probably without directly using any encryption scheme.
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A Security Analysis
Obviously the resolution ambiguity property in PAOFE follows from that in AOFE.
Theorem 1. The generic construction is perfect ambiguous if E = (Kg,Enc,Dec) is an IE-IK-CCA
secure encryption.
Proof. To show perfect ambiguity, we convert any adversary A that wins the experiment PAM into
an adversary A′ that breaks the IE-IK-CCA security of E . Recall that A′ gets ek as input and has
access to oracle ODec. Suppose the public parameter PM is generated. A first chooses a public
adjudication key APK and outputs it, and keeps a corresponding secret state information ASK∗
private. A′ sets PM := PM, APK := APK, and runs Γ.SetupUser(PM,APK) → (SKB , PKB)
and invokes A on input PKB := (PKB, ek).
Given a partial signature signing query (M,PKj = (PKj , ekj)) to oracle O
B
PSig, A′ runs Γ.PSig
(M ||PKB ||PKj , SKB , PKB, PKj , APK) → σ′P , and then encrypts σ′P under ekj by running c =
E .Encekj (σ′P ). A′ returns c to A as the answer.
Given a fake partial signing query (M,PKi) where PKi = (PKi, eki) to oracle O
B
FakePSig, A′
runs Γ.PSig(M ||PKi||PKB , SKB , PKB , PKi, APK) → σ′P , and then encrypts σ′P under ekB by
running c = E .Encek(σ′P ). A′ returns c to A as the answer.
Given a partial signature verification query (M,σP ,PKi = (PKi, eki)) to O
B
PVer, A′ makes a
decryption query σP to its own oracle ODec. Denote the answer from ODec is σ
′
P . A′ returns Γ.PVer
(M ||PKi||PKB , σ′P , PKi, PKB, APK) to A.
At some time, A submits (M∗, (SKA,PKA)), where SKA := (SKA, dkA), and SKA matches
PKA. A′ runs Γ.PSig(M∗||PKA||PKB , SKA, PKA, PKB, APK) → σ′P , and submits σ′P to its
own challenger, which returns a ciphertext c∗. A′ forwards σP := c∗ to A, and then continues to
simulate the oracles OBPSig and O
B
FakePSig in the same way as above. About the further queries
(M,σp,PKi) where PKi = (PKi, eki) to oracle O
B
PVer, we distinguish the following two case:
1. σP ̸= c∗. In this case, A′ simulates OBPVer in the same way as above.
2. σP = c
∗. In this case, A′ just returns ⊥ to the adversary A. First of all, we can exclude the
subcase where (M, c∗,PKi) = (M
∗, c∗,PKA), because (M
∗, c∗,PKA) is prohibited from being
queried to oracle OBPVer. If (M , c
∗, PKi) ̸= (M∗, c∗,PKA) and PVer(M , c∗, SKB, PKi, PKB,
APK) = ⊤, the probability of this happening is negligible.




PVer are simulated properly by A′.
Finally, A outputs a bit d. A′ outputs a bit b′ = d, and A′ has never issued a query to its decryption
oracle ODec on input c
∗. If A succeeds in the experiment, A′ also succeeds in outputting the bit
b′. Therefore A′’s advantage is also non-negligible. 2
Theorem 2. The generic construction is signer ambiguous if Γ = (PMGen, SetupTTP, SetupUser,
Sig, Ver, PSig, PVer, Res) is signer ambiguous.
Proof. To show signer ambiguity, we convert any adversary A that wins the experiment SAM into
an adversary A′ that breaks the signer ambiguity security of Γ . Recall that A′ gets APK as input
and has access to oracle O′Res. Suppose the public parameter PM is generated. A′ invokes A on
input APK := APK.
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Given a resolution query (M,PKi,PKj) where PKi = (PKi, eki) and PKj = (PKj , ekj) to
ORes, supposeA sends σ′P toA′ in the first run of the protocol.A′ makes a query (M ||PKi||PKj , σ′P ,
PKi, PKj) to its own oracle O
′
Res and returns the answer to A.
At some time, A submits (M∗, (SK0, PK0), (SK1, PK1)), where SK0 := (SK0, dk0), PK0 :=
(PK0, ek0), SK1 := (SK1, dk1), PK1 := (PK1, ek1) and SKb matches PKb for b = 0, 1. A′ submits
(M∗||PK0||PK1, (SK0, PK0), (SK1, PK1)) to its own challenger, which returns a partial signature
σ∗P with respect to the secret key SKb for some random choice b ∈ {0, 1}. A′ encrypts σ∗P under
the public encryption key ek1, i.e., c = E .Encek1(σ∗P ), and forwards σP := c∗ to A as the answer.
A′ then continues to simulate the oracle ORes in the same way as above.
It can be seen that the oracle ORes is simulated properly by A′. Finally, A outputs a bit d.
A′ outputs a bit b′ = d and halts. Since A is not allowed to issue a query (M∗,PK0,PK1) to
the resolution oracle ORes, A′ has never made a query to its oracle O′Res with respect to message
M∗||PK0||PK1. If A succeeds in the experiment, A′ also succeeds in outputting the bit b′ with the
same probability. A′’s advantage is also non-negligible. 2
Theorem 3. The generic construction is secure against signers if Γ = (PMGen, SetupTTP, SetupUser,
Sig, Ver, PSig, PVer, Res) is secure against signers.
Proof. To show security against signers, we convert any adversary A that wins the experiment SAS
into an adversaryA′ that breaks the security against signers of Γ . Recall thatA′ gets (APK,PKB)




Res. A′ runs E .KGen(1κ)→ (ekB, dkB) and invokes
A on input APK := APK and PKB := (PKB , ekB).
Given a partial signing query (M,PKj) where PKj = (PKj , ekj) to oracle O
B
PSig, A′ makes a




P . A′ then
encrypt it under the public encryption key ekj , i.e., c = E .Encekj (σ′P ), and returns σP := c to A
as the answer.
Given a fake partial signing query (M,PKi) where PKi = (PKi, eki) to oracle O
B
FakePSig, A′
makes a query (M ||PKi||PKB, PKi) to its own oracle O′BPSig. Denote the answer from O′
B
PSig is
σ′P . A′ then encrypt it under the public encryption key ekB , i.e., c = E .EncekB (σ′P ), and returns
σP := c to A as the answer.
Given a partial signature verification query (M,σP ,PKi = (PKi, eki)) to O
B
PVer, A′ de-
crypts σP using its own decryption key dkB, i.e., σ
′
P = E .DecdkB (σP ), and returns Γ.PVer
(M ||PKi||PKB , σ′P , PKi, PKB, APK) to A.
Given a resolution query (M,PKi,PKj) where PKi = (PKi, eki) and PKj = (PKj , ekj) to
OBRes, supposeA sends σ′P toA′ in the first run of the protocol.A′ makes a query (M ||PKi||PKj , σ′P ,
PKi, PKj) to its own oracle O
′
Res and returns the answer to A.




PVer and ORes are simulated prop-
erly by A′. Finally, A outputs a partial signature σ∗P on message M∗ under PKA, PKB where
PKA = (PKA, ekA). A′ decrypts σ∗P under the decryption key dkB , i.e., σ̃P = E .DecdkB (σ∗P )
and outputs (M∗||PKA||PKB , σ̃P , PKA). Notice that σ̃P is a valid partial signature on mes-
sage M∗||PKA||PKB under PKA and PKB , i.e. Γ.PVer(M∗||PKA||PKB , σ̃P , PKA, PKB , APK) =
⊤, but it can not be resolved to a valid full signature by the resolution algorithm Γ.Res, i.e.
Γ.Res(M∗||PKA||PKB, σ̃P , ASK,PKA, PKB) = ⊥. Since A is prohibited from making a query
(M∗,PKA) to oracle O
B
FakePSig, A′ has never issued a query (M∗||PKA||PKB, PKA) to its own
oracle O′
B
PSig, thus if A succeeds in the experiment, A′ also succeeds with the same probability in
breaking the security against signers of Γ . 2
Theorem 4. The generic construction is secure against verifiers if Γ = (PMGen, SetupTTP,
SetupUser, Sig, Ver, PSig, PVer, Res) is secure against verifiers.
Proof. To show security against verifiers, we convert any adversary A that wins the experiment
SAV into an adversary A′ that breaks the security against verifiers of Γ . Recall that A′ gets




Res. A′ runs E .KGen(1κ)→ (ekA, dkA)
and invokes A on input APK := APK and PKA := (PKA, ekA).
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Given a partial signing query (M,PKj) where PKj = (PKj , ekj) to oracle OPSig, A′ makes a
query (M ||PKA||PKj , PKj) to its own oracle O′PSig. Denote the answer from O′PSig is σ′P . A′ then
encrypt it under the public encryption key ekj , i.e., c = E .Encekj (σ′P ), and returns σP := c to A
as the answer.
Given a fake partial signing query (M,PKi) where PKi = (PKi, eki) to oracle OFakePSig, A′
makes a query (M ||PKi||PKA, PKi) to its own oracle O′PSig. Denote the answer from O′PSig is σ′P . A′
then encrypt it under the public encryption key ekA, i.e., c = E .EncekA(σ′P ), and returns σP := c
to A as the answer.
Given a partial signature verification query (M,σP ,PKi = (PKi, eki)) to oracle OPVer, A′
decrypts σP using its own decryption key dkA, i.e., σ
′
P = E .DecdkA(σP ), and returns Γ.PVer
(M ||PKi||PKA, σ′P , PKi, PKA, APK) to A.
Given a resolution query (M,PKi,PKj) where PKi = (PKi, eki) and PKj = (PKj , ekj) to
ORes, supposeA sends σ′P toA′ in the first run of the protocol.A′ makes a query (M ||PKi||PKj , σ′P ,
PKi, PKj) to its own oracle O
′
Res and returns the answer to A.
It can be seen that the oracles OFakePSig, OPSig, OPVer and ORes are simulated properly
by A′. Finally, A returns a full signature σ∗ on message M∗ under PKA, PKB where PKB =
(PKB, ekB) such that Ver(M
∗, σ∗,PKA,PKB ,APK) = ⊤, which means Γ.Ver(M∗||PKA||PKB, σ∗,
PKA, PKB , APK) = ⊤. A′ outputs (M∗||PKA||PKB, σ∗, PKB) and aborts. Since A is prohibited
from making a query (M∗,PKA,PKB) to oracle ORes, A′ has never made a query with respect to
message M∗||PKA||PKB to its own oracle O′Res. If A succeeds in the experiment, A′ also succeeds
in breaking the security against verifiers of Γ . Thus A′’s advantage is also non-negligible. 2
Theorem 5. The generic construction is secure against the arbitrator if Γ = (PMGen, SetupTTP,
SetupUser, Sig,Ver,PSig,PVer,Res) is secure against the arbitrator.
Proof. To show security against the arbitrator, we convert any adversary A that wins the experi-
ment SAA into an adversary A′ that breaks the security against the arbitrator of Γ . Suppose the
public parameter PM is generated. A first chooses a public adjudication key APK and outputs
it, and keeps a corresponding secret state information ASK∗ private. A′ sets APK := APK, gets
PKA as input, and has access to oracles O
′
PSig. A′ runs E .KGen(1κ) → (ekA, dkA) and invokes A
on input PKA := (PKA, ekA).
Given a partial signing query (M,PKj) where PKj = (PKj , ekj) to oracle OPSig, A′ makes a
query (M ||PKA||PKj , PKj) to its own oracle O′PSig. Suppose the answer from O′PSig is σ′P . A′ then
encrypt it under the public encryption key ekj , i.e., c = E .Encekj (σ′P ), and returns σP := c to A
as the answer.
Given a fake partial signing query (M,PKi) where PKi = (PKi, eki) to oracle OFakePSig, A′
makes a query (M ||PKi||PKA, PKi) to its own oracle O′PSig. Denote the answer from O′PSig is σ′P . A′
then encrypt it under the public encryption key ekA, i.e., c = E .EncekA(σ′P ), and returns σP := c
to A as the answer.
Given a partial signature verification query (M,σP ,PKi = (PKi, eki)) to oracle OPVer, A′
decrypts σP using its own decryption key dkA, i.e., σ
′
P = E .DecdkA(σP ), and returns Γ.PVer
(M ||PKi||PKA, σ′P , PKi, PKA, APK) to A.
It can be seen that the oracles OFakePSig, OPSig and OPVer are simulated properly by A′.
Finally, A returns a full signature σ∗ on message M∗ under PKA, PKB where PKB = (PKB , ekB),
such that Ver(M∗, σ∗,PKA,PKB ,APK) = ⊤, which means Γ.Ver(M∗|| PKA|| PKB , σ∗, PKA,
PKB , APK) = ⊤. A′ outputs (M∗||PKA||PKB , σ∗, PKB) and aborts. Since A is prohibited from
making a query (M∗,PKA,PKB) to oracle OPSig, A′ has not made a query with respect to message
M∗||PKA||PKB to its own oracle O′PSig. If A succeeds in the experiment, A′ also succeeds with the
same probability in breaking the security against the arbitrator of Γ , as σ∗ is a valid full signature
on message M∗||PKA||PKB under PKA, PKB . Thus A′’s advantage is also non-negligible. 2
